Genetic adverse selection: Evidence from long-term care insurance and Huntington disease

Emily Oster, Ira Shoulson, Kimberly Quaid, E. Ray Dorsey

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Individual, personalized genetic information is increasingly available, leading to the possibility of greater adverse selection over time, particularly in individual-payer insurance markets. We use data on individuals at risk for Huntington disease (HD), a degenerative neurological disorder with significant effects on morbidity, to estimate adverse selection in long-term care insurance. We find strong evidence of adverse selection: individuals who carry the HD genetic mutation are up to 5 times as likely as the general population to own long-term care insurance. This finding is supported both by comparing individuals at risk for HD to those in the general population and by comparing across tested individuals in the HD-risk population with and without the HD mutation.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1041-1050
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume94
Issue number11-12
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2010

Fingerprint

Long-term care insurance
Adverse selection
Mutation
General population
Genetic information
Morbidity
Insurance market

Keywords

  • Adverse selection
  • Genetic testing
  • Huntington disease
  • Long-term care insurance

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Genetic adverse selection : Evidence from long-term care insurance and Huntington disease. / Oster, Emily; Shoulson, Ira; Quaid, Kimberly; Dorsey, E. Ray.

In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 94, No. 11-12, 12.2010, p. 1041-1050.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Oster, Emily ; Shoulson, Ira ; Quaid, Kimberly ; Dorsey, E. Ray. / Genetic adverse selection : Evidence from long-term care insurance and Huntington disease. In: Journal of Public Economics. 2010 ; Vol. 94, No. 11-12. pp. 1041-1050.
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